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Pharmaceutical Reform In South Korea And The
Lessons It Provides
The reform’s implementation, although well-intentioned and
successful in some respects, was imperfect from the start.
by Hak-Ju Kim and Jennifer Prah Ruger
ABSTRACT: Through implementation of its 2000 pharmaceutical reform, the South Ko-
rean government expected to reduce the cost of medications and improve service levels,
medical appropriateness of care, and drug effectiveness. However, despite the reform’s
lofty goals, unintended consequences have distorted the supply of medical services and
spending. These consequences have included increasing the use of uninsured services,
prescribing high-price drugs, and a growing market share for multinational drug companies.
Further reforms are needed to reduce the measure’s adverse effects. This paper examines
the Korean mandatory prescription system and offers an analysis of Korea’s reforms.
[Health Affairs 27, no. 4 (2008): w260–w269 (published online 28 May 2008; 10.1377/
hlthaff.27.4.w260)]
I
n recent years , multinational phar-
maceutical companies have focused in-
creasing attention on South Korea. This
attention has resulted largely from the Korean
Health Care System Reform Act of 2000, or
Separation of Prescribing and Dispensing
(SPD). The new system prohibits doctors
from dispensing medications to outpatients,
and it bans pharmacists from prescribing
drugs.1 Under the old system, pharmacists
were allowed to write prescriptions, while
doctors were free to dispense medications di-
rectly to their patients. Consequently, both
doctors and pharmacists made higher profits,
while patients unknowingly abused pre-
scribed drugs. Abuse of drugs, particularly of
antibiotics, was a chief reason that health au-
thorities introduced the reform. Since 1 July
2000, drug dispensaries at hospitals have
been shut down, and patients must purchase
medicines at pharmacies using prescriptions
from their doctors. General pharmaceutical
products, such as antacids and painkillers, re-
main freely available at pharmacies.
This reform represented a structural shift
in Korea’s health delivery system, because it
not only altered patterns of medical services
provided by doctors to patients, but also in-
creased the average fee-schedule price, ex-
panded foreign companies’ share of the domes-
tic pharmaceutical market, and added to the
large deficit in the government’s health insur-
ance budget. The government argues that the
reform has been successful, because the use of
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antibiotics and injections in Korea has de-
clined under the new system, leading to an ac-
tual reduction in health care spending. For in-
stance, hospitals prescribed antibiotics to 43
percent of patients on average in the third
quarter of 2001, down from 49 percent in the
previous year. In the same period, hospitals
also wrote prescriptions for injections for an
average of 6 percent of patients—a 47 percent
decrease from 12 percent in the previous quar-
ter.2 Hospital insurance claims also reveal a
marked decline in medicines,
including steroid use.3 The
number of different antibiot-
ics and other drugs pre-
scribed per episode also ap-
pears to have decreased after
the dispensing restriction, al-
though no obvious differ-
ences were found in these re-
ductions between viral and
bacterial illness.4
However, government
health spending has increased, and multina-
tional pharmaceutical manufacturers remain
upbeat about their prospects in this major
Asian market, the eleventh largest in the
world. For example, according to Korea’s
Health Insurance Review Agency (HIRA),
since the reform, the market share of high-
price drugs has increased from 36.2 percent to
54.3 percent and that of original brand-name
drugs has increased from 11.35 percent to 14.82
percent.5 In addition, a survey of consumers
demonstrates that transportation difficulties
and time costs have restricted public access to
medical facilities and pharmacies.6 The gov-
ernment is currently intent upon reducing
these expenditures and patient costs with var-
ious cost containment measures, such as Ac-
tual Transaction Pricing (ATP), and offsetting
them with a tobacco tax.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an
analysis of the reform and its effects on health
care spending and the pharmaceutical indus-




Successful implementation of its economic
development plan enabled the Korean govern-
ment to introduce a public medical insurance
system (National Health Insurance, or NHI) in
the late 1970s. To enlist public support, the
government set low medical service charges
for insured patients, a practice that did not
change much until recently. The low premium
rates in the NHI scheme,
along with limited coverage
and benefits, left many people
underinsured. To help stabi-
lize its finances, the NHI sys-
tem subsidized and reim-
bursed less than 50 percent of
expenditures for health in-
surance in various regions.7
To compensate for lost in-
come, doctors’ clinics and
hospitals turned to prescrib-
ing drugs and selling them,
for profit, directly to their patients at their dis-
pensaries. They also charged custom fees for
uninsured medical services. Meanwhile, phar-
macists increased their incomes by influencing
customers’ self-medicating behavior and sup-
plying the products they prescribed.
These practices had long been a bone of
contention between groups representing doc-
tors and pharmacists.8 They had also been
blamed for rampant misuse and abuse of phar-
maceuticals. Moreover, critics blamed them
and the fee-for-service (FFS) system for in-
creasing the portion of the country’s debt at-
tributable to the NHI system. Additionally, ex-
cept for some illegal items such as opiates,
people could purchase special drugs without
any prescription from either doctors or phar-
macists. Korean doctors and pharmacists also
were widely known for prescribing excessive
doses of antibiotics, to boost their profits and
respond to patients’ expectations. The rate of
antibiotic resistance among Koreans was
among the world’s highest before the reform.9
The overuse of drugs, especially antibiotics, in-
creased the overall resistance of germs, render-
M a r k e t W a t c h








largest in the world.”
by guest
 on June 26, 2013Health Affairs by content.healthaffairs.orgDownloaded from 
ing medication less effective and diseases more
virulent. Under the old pharmaceutical sys-
tem, Korea was ranked highest in the world in
penicillin resistance.10 The country’s high drug
spending was another important factor
prompting reform in this area. Drug costs ac-
counted for approximately 31 percent of na-
tional health spending before the reform.11
These problems and the growing overlap
between the roles of doctors and pharmacists
prompted efforts to separate the two profes-
sions’ functions and ultimately to separate
medical institutions from pharmacies.12 How-
ever, implementing the decision-making proc-
ess envisioned in the reform had been post-
poned several times by politics and by stake-
holders’ delaying tactics.13 The first govern-
ment discussion on separating prescribing
from dispensing took place back in 1963, fol-
lowing numerous committee meetings. A
broad blueprint emerged in the late 1980s. At
that time, the beginning date was to be July
1991, but it was postponed in the legislature. In
December 1993 the Ministry of Health and
Welfare (MOHW) took new legal steps to
separate the roles of doctors and pharmacists,
setting 7 July 1999 as the final implementation
date. But opposition from the Korean Medical
Association (KMA) and the Korean Pharma-
cists Association (KPA) forced a further delay,
and successful implementation continued to
elude the government. The reform effort truly
concluded 1 July 2000, with the SPD Act.
Increase In National Medical
Expenditures And Fee-Schedule
Prices
Initially, the Korean government expected
the reform to achieve the following major ob-
jectives: (1) to divide roles between physicians
and pharmacists and to prevent unnecessary
and incorrect prescriptions, therefore reduc-
ing total health spending; and (2) to prevent
abuse and misuse of medications, and to re-
duce the damage that results.14 But doctors and
hospitals intensified their opposition to the
new system, fearing that it would severely cut
their earnings because their businesses had be-
come heavily dependent on drug sales.15 Mem-
bers of the KMA threatened collectively to
close their clinics unless the government aban-
doned the plan or increased consultation fees
to offset lost income. Responding to doctors’
demands for concessions in exchange for re-
form, and to avert the threat of hospital and
clinic closures, the MOHW authorized a 72
percent increase in consultation fees for seeing
outpatients and a fivefold increase in prescrib-
ing fees for the year 2000.16 The legislation’s
final form incorporated these concessions.
Exhibit 1 shows an increasing trend in na-
tional medical expenditures (NME) as a per-
centage of gross domestic product (GDP).17
NME in Korea was roughly 6.0 percent of GDP
in 2005, up from 4.8 percent in 2000. Between
1983 and 1999, however, the NME share of
GDP remained fairly consistent.18 Exhibit 2
compares the annual percentage increases in
Korea’s GDP, NME, and average medical prices
as established by the national fee schedule.19
The rate of growth of NME was 27–28 percent
annually in 1995–1996 and declined to 9 per-
cent in 1999; GDP growth was anomalously
high in 1995, about 17 percent, and then de-
clined to below zero in 1998, rebounding to 10
percent in 1999. However, some specific trends
in both indicators illuminate the relative im-
pact of NME on GDP. For example, averaged
out for the whole period 1991–2005, NME in-
creased at an annual rate of 16 percent, com-
pared with about 10 percent for GDP. Aver-
aged across 1991 to 1995, the NME growth rate
remained constant at around 15 percent. How-
ever, the economy declined sharply after 1996;
in 1998, the GDP growth rate neared zero or
worse. Moreover, with the exception of 2002,
over the decade from 1995 to 2005 the NME
growth rate remained higher than the GDP
growth rate, and NME as a share of GDP in-
creased (Exhibit 1). The rise in this indicator
brought widespread concern that health care
costs were out of control.
Since then, NME has appeared to increase
continuously. Since the pharmaceutical reform
was implemented, a steady rise in outpatient
medical insurance fees has inflated the NHI’s
budget deficit. According to the Korean
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Health Administration, total outpatient medi-
cal insurance fees were estimated at 9.8 trillion
won in 1999 (before reform) and at 12.9 trillion
won in 2001 (after reform)—a yearly increase
of 1.5 trillion won.20 Thus, the government’s
hope to lower costs has not yet borne fruit.
MOHW budget figures reveal that spending
on reimbursed drugs rose by roughly 25 per-
cent to 4.5 trillion won (approximately
US$4.3 billion) in 2001, while the higher doc-
tors’ fees and substantial dispensing fees for
pharmacies (formerly included in doctors’
margins) have raised the deficit in the MOHW
insurance budget.21
Pharmaceutical spending in 2006 was 8.4
trillion won, which accounts for 29.4 percent
of total health insurance payments (Exhibit
3).22 Increasing medication costs may be ex-
plained by an increasing number of patients
who take more expensive and diverse brand-
name drugs, driven by supply-side changes,
such as fortified marketing efforts by pharma-
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EXHIBIT 2
Annual Changes In Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), National Medical
Expenditures (NME), And Average Fee-Schedule Prices, 1991–2005
SOURCES: Korea National Statistical Office, Yearly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Statistics in Korean Statistical Information
System (Seoul: NSO, 2007); and Ministry of Health and Welfare, National Medical Expenditures and Fee-Schedule Prices
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ceutical companies. To resolve this problem,
the MOHW recently introduced the so-called
Positive List System (PLS), under which only
medicines proven effective but also price-
competitive are covered by the NHI.23
Reaction From The Health Care
Market
 Increased incomes. Despite doctors’
and pharmacists’ fears about the reform’s eco-
nomic consequences, the average annual in-
come per doctor’s clinic increased from 299
million won in 1998 to 338 million won in
2001. The average annual income per phar-
macy increased even more during the same pe-
riod, from 60 million to 305 million won.24 Es-
timated average annual profit increases related
to reform ranged from 50 million to 83 million
won per doctor’s clinic and from 23 million to
87 million won per pharmacy.25 The rapid
growth in doctors’ incomes is partly attributed
to the reform’s drastic increase in service fees,
which in turn caused large-scale migration of
doctors from hospitals to clinics. Medical fees
for insured services in clinics rose (up to 33
percent) at a much higher rate than in hospi-
tals, where increases (or decreases) were –4
percent at professional hospitals, –2 percent at
general hospitals, and 10 percent at hospitals.26
In addition, faced with profit loss from reform,
hospitals decided to provide uninsured medi-
cal services, for which fees are not regulated,
with higher margins to recover these losses.
The percentage of patients’ out-of-pocket ex-
pense burden for uninsured medical services
increased greatly after reform, while the
growth rate of total medicine spending de-
creased slightly. From 1999 to 2001, the profit
on average from uninsured services increased
more than 8 percent in hospitals. For example,
the percentage of total profits stemming from
uninsured services in general hospitals has
risen from 19 percent before SPD reform to 26
percent afterward; for regular hospitals, it rose
from 21 percent to 30 percent.27
 Prescribing patterns. Another factor
that can greatly increase medical spending is
doctors’ prescribing patterns. Currently, doc-
tors prefer to prescribe brand-name or im-
ported products, which are relatively costly
compared with domestic counterparts. The
percentage of high-price prescriptions for out-
patients increased from 26.01 percent (in
March 2000) to 34.36 percent (in March 2001)
at clinics, and from 59.37 percent to 73.21 per-
cent at general professional hospitals.28 As a
result, sales by pharmaceutical companies rose
consistently after the reform, particularly
among multinational companies, by 138.8 per-
cent in total from the second half of 1999 to the
second half of 2002.29 With drugs accounting
for roughly 30 percent of NHI spending, the
government introduced Actual Transaction
Pricing (ATP) in 1999 to control prices. ATP
reimburses hospitals for the price they pay for
a drug, rather than the official list price, thus
eliminating profiteering when suppliers dis-
count drugs. ATP cut reimbursement prices by
an average of 31 percent between 1999 and
2000, and the MOHW subsequently reduced
prices to discounted levels determined by reg-
ular market surveys.30
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EXHIBIT 3
Trends In Pharmaceutical Expenditure In Korea’s National Health Insurance (NHI),
Billions Of Korean Won, 2001–2006
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total expenditure




















SOURCES: National Health Insurance Corporation, Statistical Yearbook 2005 (Seoul: NHIC, 2006); and Ministry of Health and
Welfare, White Book on Health and Welfare 2006 (Seoul: MOHW, 2007).
a Not recorded.
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ATP combined with reform removed one
(profit-based) incentive for doctors to pre-
scribe drugs, by eliminating their profit from
drugs, which had been the main source of their
income. However, it still failed to offer eco-
nomic incentives for providers to reduce total
prescriptions and provide high-quality medi-
cines at reasonable costs to patients. Accord-
ing to the Korea Institute for Health and Social
Affairs (KIHASA), for example, the average
number of prescribed medicines per case fell
only slightly, from 6.09 items
in 1999 to 5.80 items in 2001.
However, the cost of pharma-
ceuticals per episode has
risen (by 11.80 percent) from
1,170.20 won to 1,308.30
won.31 These findings suggest
that increases in health care
costs might have resulted
from price increases in pre-
scribed drugs rather than a decrease in quanti-
ties of prescribed drugs.
 Effects on manufacturers. Moreover,
NHI reimbursement cuts affected domestic
pharmaceutical companies more than multi-
nationals: Korean firms’ margins to wholesal-
ers, which hold a monopoly over supply to
hospitals with more than 100 beds, are kept in
close check. Also, ATP has failed to halt dis-
counting, which has been driven under the ta-
ble, and the system does little to encourage
price competition because hospitals have no
incentive to choose lower-price drugs. In addi-
tion, foreign pharmaceutical companies now
give sizable noncash benefits to doctors in
hospitals and clinics as advertising, affecting
doctors’ prescribing practices.32 The use of
multinational and domestic brand-name prod-
ucts has soared, causing a shift away from
cheaper generics.
 Illegal prescribing. As another limita-
tion, the reform did not clearly prevent phar-
macists from supplying prescriptions illegally
at patients’ request, despite repeated pledges
to the contrary. Although in the past several
years only a few hospitals and pharmacists
have been disciplined for unauthorized activ-
ity, the government should take this problem
seriously and enact concrete measures to pre-
vent it. Recent assessments of pharmacists re-
vealed 400 irregularities in 2001, including dis-
pensing substitute medicines without a
doctor’s consent and writing unauthorized
prescriptions.33 The current system lacks suffi-
cient means to control abuse by pharmacists.
 Foreign competition. Another problem
is the threat of foreign pharmaceutical compa-
nies’ domination in Korea’s drug market. For
example, the change in the market share of do-
mestic pharmaceutical com-
panies before and after SPD
reveals some interesting
trends. It fell from 32.2 per-
cent in 1999 to 23.7 percent in
2000 (a 26.4 percent decline)
for small and midsize compa-
nies and from 58.3 percent to
53.6 percent (a 8.1 percent de-
cline) for large companies
during the same period. For foreign compa-
nies, however, market share increased from 9.6
percent in 1999 to 22.7 percent in 2000, a 136
percent increase.34 The coverage provided by
the NHI includes imported drugs, spurring
drug imports. In 2001, multinational compa-
nies registered in South Korea increased their
sales by 13 percent, to 4.9 trillion won (US$4.7
billion).35 Of the top ten drugs prescribed in
2001, seven were produced by foreign compa-
nies or their local licensees, while just three
came from local firms—Korea Green Cross,
Dong A, and Il Dong.36
 Antibiotics. In terms of antibiotic use, a
major concern before SPD, according to the
MOHW, the number of antibiotics and injec-
tions prescribed by doctors dropped two years
after reform.37 However, whether this improve-
ment came mainly from the new division of la-
bor between doctors and pharmacists is un-
clear. Indeed, the significance of improvement
itself is disputed.38 The MOHW evidence is
not consistent with results from other govern-
ment agencies. For instance, recent data from
the Korea Food and Drug Administration indi-
cated that antibiotic production and imports
have increased steadily since the reform (Ex-
hibit 4), which implies that antibiotic use
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might have actually increased. To evaluate
changes in doctors’ prescribing behavior accu-
rately, more time must elapse, and the array of
factors influencing doctors’ prescribing behav-
ior must be considered.
Lessons From The Pharmaceutical
Reform
The results of Korea’s reforms have revealed
vulnerabilities in the current national health
care system, including the public service deliv-
ery system, the inconsistent decision-making
process, medical treatment abuses, and exces-
sive inflation in health care costs.39
 Consumers’ reaction. In the early days
of the new system, some experts voiced con-
cern that Korea was not ready for reform.40
They argued that forced implementation
would confuse and inconvenience the public,
because no single pharmacy could possibly
stock all of the drugs needed for every illness.
Patients would have to visit many pharmacies
to find prescribed drugs. However, recent sur-
veys report that after an initial adjustment pe-
riod, inconvenience is decreasing, and patients
are adapting to the new system.41 Antibiotic
prescribing for patients also declined after the
dispensing restriction, although there are on-
going debates in terms of data reliability and
validity, as mentioned above.
 Dispensing costs. However, the reform,
which was preceded by ATP, raised dispensing
costs as a result of the loss of competitive price
control, adding an unnecessary burden to the
NHI budget. Prices of drugs prescribed by
doctors rose rapidly, and dosing periods
lengthened. Although the reform eliminated
the economic incentive to prescribe medica-
tions, the current system offers little economic
incentive to trim the overuse of high-price
drugs. According to the MOHW, the percent-
age of patients using relatively high-price,
brand-name drugs, when alternatives of equal
quality are available, rose from 26 percent in
May 2000 to 54 percent in May 2001.42 In-
creases in the price and quantity of prescribed
brand-name drugs have directly exacerbated
the health insurance crisis.
 Implementation challenges. The re-
form’s implementation, although well-inten-
tioned and successful in some respects, was
imperfect from the start. For instance, the
MOHW bars hospitals and pharmacies from
occupying the same building, but that rule is
neither binding nor backed by disciplinary ac-
tion. Government negotiators have even given
in to doctors’ demands for the right to sell pre-
scribed intravenous medicines. In fact, they
have made many concessions to doctors, in-
cluding a 69 percent hike in prescription
charges. Thus, insurance premiums had to be
raised by 9 percent in 2000 to meet increased
costs.43
Because the reform transformed en-
trenched customs, however, it could require
several years to take full effect. Koreans should
be ready to endure some transitions. The gov-
ernment must clarify its role and its ability to
establish transparent drug transaction proce-
dures. By granting concessions to enact re-
form, the government appears to have frus-
trated its own goals. There is a real possibility
that the reform will not succeed without
further appropriate modifications.
 Threats to reform. First among the key
factors that threaten the reform is the political
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EXHIBIT 4
Drugs Imported Into Korea That Contain Antibiotics, 2000–2003
2000 2001 2002 2003
Number of imported drugs containing antibiotics









SOURCE: Korea Food and Drug Administration, “Annual Statistics on Antibiotics Production and Import from Overseas,”
National Assembly’s Inspection Report by Congressman M.O. Ahn (Seoul: National Assembly Secretariat, 4 October 2004).
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strength of the health services sector, which is
primarily dependent on private institutions.
Reform might have been more successful if the
government had provided economic incentives
to doctors to select medical products appro-
priately and cost-effectively.44 The government
also might have expanded its role as a major
provider of medical care to the public. These
limitations have exacerbated market function-
ing and raised concerns about government
leadership.
Second, the process by which the reform
was developed and implemented was affected
by a number of political realities, and it pro-
ceeded without evidence based on carefully
testing the effects of its interventions in Ko-
rea’s private and public health economy. Gov-
ernment regulations need to be implemented
more effectively, to prevent subsequent fail-
ures.45
Third, inside the domestic pharmaceutical
market, the reform combined with ATP is forc-
ing Korean pharmaceutical companies, which
traditionally have depended on domestic mar-
kets, into a situation similar to their Japanese
counterparts. Japanese companies are going
through mergers and acquisitions to survive
pharmaceutical reform because of intensifying
competition with multinational companies in
their home market. Many academic experts
and nongovernmental organization (NGO)
leaders expect that Korean drug makers will
do the same in coming years.46
T
he korean government expected
the pharmaceutical reform to reduce
the cost and misuse of medications and
improve drug efficacy. In January 2008 it im-
plemented a drug formulary (the PLS) that
lists relatively cheap alternatives of the same
quality as brand-name drugs. It will penalize
doctors and consumers who still prefer ex-
pensive brand-name products, by limiting
benefits to hospitals and increasing patients’
out-of-pocket expenses. Some argue, how-
ever, that trying to reduce the demand for
high-price items will thwart physicians’ duty
to choose the best medication for each pa-
tient.47
Despite its lofty aims, the pharmaceutical
reform has resulted in unintended distortions
in the supply of medical services and expendi-
tures, increasing the use of uninsured services
and high-price drugs, and expanding market
share for multinational companies. It also is re-
sulting in the full separation of medical insti-
tutions and pharmacies for outpatient care.48
Further reform bills are needed to reduce these
unintended adverse effects. Introducing rec-
ommended drug formularies and restricting
insurance benefits for those not on the list may
help restrict unnecessary growth in medical
spending. Thoughtful consideration of evi-
dence-based incentives and disincentives for
health care providers will be crucial in future
reforms.
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